Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Bingham and Garfield Railway v. North Utah
Mining Company of Bingham: Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dickson, Ellis, Ellis and Schulder; Attorneys for Appellant.
Unknown.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Garfield Railway v. North Utah Mining Company, No. 2877.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

u

UT , i -.)UPRt.ME COU

lf

DOCL"v1ENT
KFU

·.

~\1

lEE

A-R-6

.·, ',

. ·.. ·. \~·
' ·. \_ ,..,I\.
...............
""

vs.
NORTH t1TAH lUNING COMPANY OF BINGHAM~
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BINGHAM & GARI"'T'LD RAILWAY COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
NORTH UTAH MTv' -; COMPANY OF BINGHAM,
a Corporation; ! ' , .-...IGHrr, HONORABLE ~VILL
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rALERAN;fueHONORABLE
CYRil.~ A. LID!'·1nd WILLIAM ROBBINS,
rpndants and Respondents.
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fendants hereinbefore described and the whole thereof
for an easement for the erection of structures necessarily
incident to the operation of said railway, and for a right
of way for the construction, maintenance and operation
of said railway * * *" and in paragraph 10, "that the title
desired and required by the plaintiff in said premises
sought to be obtained is a permanent right of way and
easement for the purposes aforesaid" (Ab. 5 and 6),
and in the amendment to the amended complaint: ''That
the title desired and required by the plaintiff in said
premises sought to be condemned is a permanent right
of way and easement for the purposes aforesaid" (A b.
11.) Which allegations were specifically and positively
denied by the answer of all the defendants other than
Robbins as follows: Deny each and every allegation
contained in paragraplls 8, 9 and 10 of plaintiff's said
complaint, (Ab. 12), and for lack of knowledge by the defendant Robbins (Ab. 15) without any proof whatsoever
on the part of the plaintiff showing the necessity therefor, and without any evidence being introduced in the
case as to such necessity, p,ither as to area or extent, that
the plaintiff, regardless of whether it could show any necessity for large portions of said tracts mentioned and
described in its said complaint, or for the exclusive possession thet·eof, was (and is, by the moneyed judgment rendered in this action) compelled to take and pay for the
said lands, the whole thereof, and for the exclusive possession and occupancy of the same.
This position is not only in contravention of all of
the adjudicated cases upon the subject, but contravenes
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the constitution of the State of Utah and its statutes, because, if the plaintiff could not show a necessity for the
taking of the property mentioned and described in its
complaint, it could not condemn the same. ' The question
of the necessity of the taking was directly put in issue by
both of the answers of the respective defendants in these
actions. 'l'hat issue having been raised by the pleadings,
the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show such
necessity, and without such a showing the court was
powerless to enter a judgment condemning said lands in
favor of the plaintiff and assessing damages for the taking of said lands in favor of the defendants. As was said
in the ease of Beaulieu Vineyard et al. vs. Superior Court
of Nappa County, et al., 6 Cal. App. Reports, page 248:
''All of the allegations of the amended complaint
were put in issue by the answer, hence it was
neeessary to find upon every material averment.
The necessity for the taking of the land, or any
portio nof it, was denied by the defendants. Petitioners made no demand that this issue should
be submitted to the jury. In fact, petitioners are
here contending that the only issue to be decided
was as to the value of the land to be condemned
and the damage to the residue, but we determine
what the issues arP by an inspection of the
pleadings.''
Southeru Pae. R. R. Co. v. Raymond, 53
Cal. 233;
City of Pasadena v. ~timson, 91 Cal. 253,
(27 Pac. 604);
Spring Valley W. W. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal.
528, (28 Pac. 681);
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City of Santa Ana v. Gildmacher, 133 Cal.
339, (65 Pac. 883).
The question of the necessity in the case at bar was
also directly in issue, but unlike California, that question
under the laws of Utah must be passed upon and decided solely by the court, and cannot be submitted to
the jury.
Section 3591 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907,
provides as follows:
'' Canditions precedent to condemnation: Before
property can be taken it must appear:
"1. That the use to which it is applied is a use authorized by law.''
Which was admitted in the answer of the defendant
North Utah Mining Company and waived by all of the
defendants at the time of the trial of the action.
'' 2. That the taking is necessary to such use.
"3. If alreadv appropriated to some public use,
that the public use to which it is to be applied is
a more necessary public use.''
And Section 3596, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, provides:
"Power of the Court. The Court or judge thereof
shall have power:
'' 1. To determine the conditions specified in 3591. ''
We respectfully submit that the record shows that
the court never iletermined upon any proof whatever
"that the taking is necessary to such use" either before
or after the submission of this case to the jury, but in the
absence of any proof whatever instructed the jury to
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assess damages in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff (upon the theory and erroneous view of the
law, and contrary to this statute and without any determination whatsoever as to the extent of the area necessary to be used by the plaintiff for the erection, maintenance and operation of its line of railway, particularly
across and oYer Tract "A") that the whole of said
Tract ''A'' was necesasry to be taken by the plaintiff,
and that the defendants should receive compensation
upon the basis that the whole of said Tract "A" was so
taken and upon the theory of exclusive use, possession
and occupancy thereof by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff realized at the very outset of the trial that
it was impossible for it to show or prove that it was
necessary or essential for it to condemn the whole of
"Tract 'A'" as alleged in its complaint, or show a
necessity for the exclusive use or occupancy of the same,
except where its concrete abutments stood. This is shown
early in the trial in the cross-examination of the third
witness placed upon the witness stand by the defendants,
where the following occurs:
'' Q. Now, I wish you would state what effect, if
any, the building of the bridge, the abutment, and the
piers, had upon the dump room there', the dumping ground
included within this No. 1 tunnel7
A. It had no special bearing on the ability to dump
on the ground, except, as I understand it, the railroad
company won't allow you to dump on their right of way.
I understand that.
Q. Well, was that a practical dumping ground be-
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fore the bridge was built 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How would you say that portion of the ground
over which the bridge is built compares, as to its dumpi:!l~ £a(?i!itic•s, h th~ ot!~er gTonT>.~l, ~jthe-,. east O!" ':'!~st¥
A. It is more favorable for dumping, because it is
not so steep a slope.
To dump on the ground to the east or west of the
right of way you have to go clear to the foot of the hill.
Q. What would you say was the effect of the operation of this ground included within this No. 1 tunnel, and
what is designated there as the Robbins stope, by the
building of this road, the tunnel and bridge, the abutments and piers?
A. ~What effect would the railroad company have 7
Q. Yes.
A. It would have no effect.
Q. What did yon mean 1
A. I mean to state that the fact of the piers and
railroad bridge being on that ground will not prevent anybody from dumping there, hut the fact of being on the
right of way, and the railroad company not allowing
theer to dump there, you can't dump there, and consequently you can't get away with your waste. That is
what I moan. It would prevent the working of the
ground.''
(See Talmage, Ahs. 64, 63, 66, 219.)
Without any determination by the court as to the extent of Tract "A" necessary to he taken by the plaintiff,
the defendants and the co1trt erroneously assmned that
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because the plaintiff had asked in its complaint for the
whole of Tract ''A'', that it could and would prove that
the whole of such tract was necessary to the use for
which the action was started. Surely the plaintiff should
IJ.O~ ~~e t"J-uiii"! !Y;- ~l1is erroncc~J ~ss~n~ptlon inG.::l;;8d in
by counsel for the defendants and the trial court, and required to pay for land which it could not prove was
necesm;ry for its railroad, and which it does not want
and can not use. It is self-evident that it is no more essential for the plaintiff to have a strip of land fifty feet
wide on each side of the abutments and steel work of its
trestle across Markham Gulch, than it would be necessary or essential for it to have one thousand feet on each
side of ::;ueh abutments and trestle work The only
ground which was essential for it to have, and for which
it could show a necessity, was the area actually covered
by the concrete abutments and upon which the steel trestle work was erected. It would be just as reasonable to
contend that an elevated street railway in a city, and constructed along a public thoroughfare, was compelled to
take and pay for and could condemn the entire street over
which such elevated railroad was built and constructed.
It is intimated in the briefs of counsel for all of the
defendants that it would be flangerous to dump earth,
rock or waste against the conerete abutments. To overeome any such contention the plaintiff offered to prove
that to flump earth, rock or material against such abutments would not in any way affeet the abutments nor the
safety of the railroad operation or maintenance. (Abs.
390.) The court refused to permit such proof and its
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error in so refusing is simply emphasized by the arguments of defendants' counsel referred to.

It is true the court granted to the plaintiff temporary
orders of possession as to all of the defendants, which will
be found on pages 685-688 of the record. These orders,
however, were in no way conclusive as to the extent of
the use or area which should be finally condemned upon
the trial of the action, and our statute expressly reserves
such question until the final determination of the action,
and the orders of possession are merely temporary. It
was therefore the duty of the court to determine what
part or portion of the lands mentioned and described in
the complaint of the plaintiff were necessary to be taken
for the use of the railroad company; in other words, as
was said in the case of Beaulieu Vineyard et al. vs. Superior Court of Nappa County, et al., quoting from the
syllabus:
"Duty of court to determine necessity. Orderly procedure. Under the circumstances shown by the
record, the court had not only the jurisdiction,
but it was its duty to determine the question of
fact, whether any, and if so what, part of the
land was necessary for the purpose of the plaintiff. The more orderly procedure would be for
the court to have allowed the amendment asked
at the trial, or to have found upon the question
of necessity before the issue of eompensation
was submitted to the jury, and Judge Burnett,
in his opinion says: 'Under the circumstances
shown by the record, the court not only had the
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jurisdiction, but it was its duty to determine the
question of fact-whether any, and if so what,
portion of the land was necessary for the purpose of the plaintiff.' "
See also Madera Ry. Co. vs. Raymond Granite Co.
3 Cal. App. 677.
See also 2 Lewis Eminent Domain, Sec. 599-600.
In the case at bar, however, the court would not permit the plaintiff to introduce any evidence whatsoever to
show what part or portion of Tract "A" was necessary
to the liSe for which said lands were sought to be condemned, but held without any proof whatsoever (except
the allegation in the complaint, which was denied by the
defendant), that the plaintiff must take the whole of the
tracts described in its complaint, whether the same were
necessary or not, and that it must take the exclusive
possession and occupancy thereof, and pay to the defendants for the whole of said tract and for the exclusive
possession and occupancy thereof, although it did not
desire to the whole of said tract, or the right to the exclusive possession and occupancy thereof.
We believe that the weight of authority, both in
cases and in reason, is with the plaintiff, that where statutes provide that only an easement is taken (Sec. 3589)
that only such easement is taken, and that the condemnor
does not, by virtue of such easement, obtain the fee title
to said lands, or the exclusive right to the possession and
occupancy of the same, as matter of law. We admitted
in oral argument and in our original brief that there were
cases which announced such a doctrine and other cases
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which use language which might be found to be favorable
to the contention of the defendants, but all such cases
were decided upon an entirely different set of facts than
the fads disclosed by the record in this case, and were
eas..,.;; w~wre [lie use to .W~iich the v\Vilt'l o; i,l1e prOLi€.t'ty
condemned sought to put said lands was disputed by the
railroad company, and the railroad company contended
that such usc by the owner would interfere with its easemPnt in sueh lands, and nonP of such cases are where the
railroad eompan.v was not only willing, but desired the
owner of the property to use it for the purposes for
which the owner claimed and sought damages.
Counst>l for the respondent Robbins on page 6 of
his brief quotes a portion of a paragraph from 15 Cyc.
pages 102:3-1024, a portion of which quotation is as
foJlows:
'' '' * *or the court in its order, limits the easement to
he aequi.rcd hy reserving certain rights and privileg(c'S to the land owner or unless such limitation is coneeded by the company.''
'I'he plaintiff not onl.v conceded, in this action, the
right of the oefendants to use the premises for which it
sought aml claimed damages, but expressly agreed that
the onler of condemnation should be entered so as to
permit the use in common by the defendants in this action, and their successors in interest of the ground,
"lands and premises embraced in the confines of Tract
'A' so that they rnay durnp earth, waste and rnaterial
upon Tract' A' * * *" (See Abs. 391.)
Said paragraph in c~'C, continues as follows:
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''This rule has, in some jurisdictions, been so far
modified as to allow the land owner to enter
upon and use the land for any purpose not inconsistent with its use by the company for any
of the objects which the railroad is intended to
~

"rr-----l:rl, "

Ll.\...-'V't.)J ..LL J.J'~..ll...' LJ..

He also quotes a small portion from Section 847,
Vol. 2, Lewis on Eminent Domain, the whole of which section reads as follows:
''Whether the company's posse>ssion is exclusive.
Rights of fee own<'r. There is no question but
that the company is entitle(] to the exclusive
pm;session of the right of way, if SUl~h possession is nl~cessary to the proper operation of the
road. RomP courts hold that the company is entitled to such f'xclusive possession from the nature of the case and as matter of law. Other
courts holtl that it is a question of fact whether
the necessities of the company require the exclusive occupaney of the right of way, and what
use of tlw same by the owner of the fee is not
inconsistent with the company's rights. The suprf'mn court of Connectieut, after referring to
the latter doetrine, says: 'Our statutes that require all railroad eompanies (under eertain
qualifications) to build continuous fences on
both sides of their roads, imply that their
possession is exdusivc, and that adjoining landowners have no greater rights than others; for,
if the law is as claimed, then the right of the
landowner to make entry on thf' track would not
be confined to regular plaees, but he might cross
anywhere along the line of his land, and might
travel lengthwise as well as crosswise, unless,
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indeed, the court should first determine, as matter of fact, that the proposed use would interfere with the operation of the railroad. It cannot be that the question is one of fact. If so,
there would be no rule at all that could be relied
upon. It would vary as often as a case arose
with the adjoining owner. In view of the responsibility of railroad companies for safely carrying persons and property and the great hazard
to human life and property from obstructions on
the track, the power to exclude every one from
the railroad limits must be left, as matter of
law, absolutely with the officers of the company,
who are immediately responsible, subject only to
such State supervision as may be deemed expedient, and such is the established doctrine, as declared by a general eoncensus of legal authority.'
It has been held that the owner of the fee has
the right to cross the right of way, for purposes
connected wit hthe use of his remaining land, and
in a manner which will not interfere with the
operation of the road, that he may lay pipes
across underneath the surface for carrying oil,
and that he may use the right of way for agricultural purposes. But he may not permanently
occupy the surface, as with buildings, a levee, or
other work or structure.''
Many cases cited in notes.
There being no proof whatsoever as to the necessity
for the use of the whole of 1'ract ''A'' by the railroad
company, we ask what justification is there for the court
to have instructed the jury as it did, that the defendants
bad no right to construct or maintain a mine track over,
upon or across Tract ''A'' from the portal of tunnel No.

lB
1 (Abs. G72), or that Robbins would permit a trespass
upon tlle exclusive rights of the plaintiff in the right of
way, as announeed in Instruction No. 11 of the court,
found at page 667 of the abstract, when the court was judin.ially advised by solemn declaration, under oath, that
tlw r•nn<lemnor had no use for the whole of such tract and
tlt ·1 il1e use thereof by defendants would not and could
noi "ffer~t the railway operation.
'"l1y should the plaintif be compelled to take land
an: ' 1'1' nxelusive possession then~of whieh it does not
'"'"l'l ean not use, pay the d0f'"'d 'nts' damages for
pr
·><l and deprive them of the llPP which it is willing
tk
"lll<l have and which they el :v'l is of great value
t
~
Chief Justice Black in iLn "ase of St. Louis
r
'V. R. Co. vs. Clark says:
rr'o1·e land and no greatw : · · """st in it need be
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way interfered with the use of the land for the
purpose of the railroad, the defendant in error
as a land owner had the right to enter upon
such land and pass under such bridges and trestle work with its teams and stock without being
a trespasser.''
We submit that this is not only good law, but good
common sense. What possible harm or ii'jury could come
from the defendants running their mine cars across this
tract of land and underneath the trestle of the railroad
company~ Mining being a public use in this state, what
possible defense could the railroad company make to a
suit brought by the mining company to condemn such a
right of way'? We frankly conceded such right upon the
trial of this action, and we do not believe that the court
was justified in making the plaintiff take such right from
the defendants and compel plaintiff to pay damages
therefor.
This court decideu in the <~ase of Utah-Ida:ho Sugar
Company vs. Stevenson, :34 Utah 184, in an opinion by his
Honor, ,Judge Straup, that where an irrigation company
had condemned a strip of land 150 feet wide and onehalf mile in length, through defendant't:l farm, that the
owner of the land nould erect gates across the canal path
and that although the same were objected to by the owner
of the easement in that such gates interfered with the use
of the path by its employees in driving horses along it
in dredging the canal, which was necessary several times
a year, the facts did not show an interference with the
reasonable enjoyment of plaintiff's easement so as to preclude a contrary finding. In this case the railroad com-
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pany not only did not object to the use of Tract A by the
owners of the mining property, but invited such use by
such owners. The defendants have the right now to go
upon said Tract ''A'' and construct mining tracks underneath the trestle and across such tract, and the railroad company would be in no position to contend that
such use by the owners of the property interfered in any
way with its easement in such tract. In fact, the railroad
company would be powerless, under the decision of this
Honorable Court, to prevent such use by the mining company or its lessees as it could not show any interference
whatsoever with the easement acquired by it. The facts
in the Stevenson case, we l'mbmit, are much stronger of an
interference with the easement condemned than they
would be in this case, as there eoul<i be none here.
The above and foregoing errors arise in this case
without regard to the amendment of the complaint by the
plaintiff, and we therefore respectfully submit that the
trial court, never having passed upon the question as
provided in Section 3591 of Compiled Laws of Utah of
1907, that the taking is necessary to such use, and instructing the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to the
exclusive possession of the land described in the complaint of the plaintiff, eommitted grievous error against
this plaintiff, and a new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
DICKSON, ELLIS, ELLIS & SCHULDER,
Attorneys for Appellant.

